Nearly $111M in data center freight stolen as thieves test ‘bump and run’ tactic

Scott Cornell explains why compromised drivers made the tactic work and how stronger carrier verification could have stopped it. The post Nearly $111M in data center freight stolen as thieves test ‘bump and run’ tactic appeared first on FreightWaves.
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Scott Cornell confirmed that cargo thieves deliberately struck security escorts protecting two high-value technology shipments. The drivers then continued with each load instead of stopping for help. Cornell serves as EVP and Crime and Theft Specialist at SPG Cargo & Logistics.
Cornell also serves as Chair of TAPA Americas and has spent more than 30 years investigating cargo theft. Cornell described the “bump-and-run” method during an interview on FreightWaves’ Fraud Watch podcast. He linked both successful crimes to failures during carrier verification.
“We’ve seen a big concentration around the theft of high-tech loads,” Cornell told FreightWaves. He identified cargo intended for data centers as a leading target. During the interview, Cornell estimated nearly $100 million in losses. He later confirmed $110. 6 million in known reported thefts since June 3.
The stolen shipments carried data center equipment and other high-value technology cargo. Several incidents involved multimillion-dollar values. Individual cases ranged from $2 million to $38 million, according to Cornell. He also cited thefts valued at $8 million, $12 million, $14 million, $20 million and $24 million.
“When you add all those up, the impact is absolutely tremendous,” Cornell said. Those amounts have pushed average loss values sharply higher. window. googletag = window. googletag || {cmd: []}; googletag. cmd. push(function() {googletag.
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push(function() {googletag. display('div-gpt-ad-1709668545404-0'); }); Watch the full Fraud Watch interview with Scott Cornell on data center cargo theft, bump and run tactics and carrier verification failures. Thieves target security escorts “On two of those thefts, they were being escorted by security teams,” Cornell said.
“Individuals intentionally crashed into the security escorts on those loads.” He called the method a significant change for cargo theft in the United States. However, Cornell cautioned against treating two events as a nationwide trend. The tactic required cooperation from each shipment’s driver, Cornell explained.
“If the drivers are bad guys, when the escorts get bumped, the drivers then take off,” he said. A legitimate operator would stop, call 911, or reach a safe location. “The drivers weren’t properly vetted,” Cornell added. Proper verification could have neutralized the entire operation, according to Cornell.
Criminals needed compromised operators to continue after each collision. Otherwise, the security distraction would not provide an escape route. “That’s what made the bump-and-run a successful tactic in both cases,” he said. Cornell offered another recent technology theft involving an obvious carrier mismatch.
A Google search showed the company operated as a hotshot auto hauler. That business accepted specialized freight outside its normal region without suitable equipment. “That was just a simple Google search,” Cornell said.
Criminal rings build their own supply chains Modern theft groups can move stolen products faster than older regional crews, according to Cornell. Those networks use cross-docks, parking-lot transfers and altered shipping documents. “These international crime rings have created their own economy,” he said.
Cornell described a separate transportation system operating alongside legitimate logistics businesses. window. googletag = window. googletag || {cmd: []}; googletag. cmd. push(function() {googletag. defineSlot('/21776187881/fw-responsive-main_content-slot3', [[728, 90], [468, 60], [320, 50], [300, 100]], 'div-gpt-ad-1665767553440-0').
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display('div-gpt-ad-1665767553440-0'); }); “People still think some of these thefts are random, and they’re not,” Cornell said. “They have customers, they have a customer base, and they’re filling orders.” Criminals can relabel stolen televisions as general electronics after a cross-dock transfer.
Another document change can identify the same shipment as freight of all kinds. Cornell identified paper bills of lading as a major weakness. Thieves can replace specific product descriptions with broader terms before returning goods to legitimate channels. “I can camouflage it just by falsifying that paperwork,” he said.
The altered documents discourage workers from opening sealed trailers and checking their contents. “Six or seven out of every 10 loads stolen in the U. S. now leave the country,” Cornell estimated. Earlier regional crews often stored products before selling smaller qua
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This briefing is based on reporting from Freightwaves. Use the original post for full primary-source context.
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